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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
The matter presently before this Appellate Court concerns the decision rendered by
the Magistrate, Theresa Gardunia, resulting in the suspension of Appellant's driving
privileges, pursuant to the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law found and entered by
the Magistrate on December 12, 2007, (Cl. R. P.13-14), which said Order of Suspension
.

.

affirmed by the Honorab1eCherie.C.Copsey on January28,2009, (Cl. R. P. 4 4 - 5 0 ) ~ <
i . : , ...:..
This Appeal is being fiirther pursued to allow this Appellate Court to review the
contention Mr. Wagner had "refused" to submit to and allow an evidentiary test to be
conducted upon him, in accordance with the requirements of the Idaho Implied Consent
Law, 518-8002, Idaho Code. The Record is clear there was a request to submit to a blood
test, and by the mutual agreement of the officer and Mr. Wagner, he did comply in all efforts
to perform an offered blood test. This process took place upon the clear disclosure he would
submit to a blood test, if requested, but did express his desire not to participate in a breath
test, because of his personal reservations of breath testing procedures. This Review turns
upon the correctness of the factual ridings and legal conclusions made, resulting in the
Decision to suspend Mr. Wagner's driver's license on December 12,2007 The effect of this
Order created a pennanent impact to his license status and the Departm~ntof Motor
Vehicles of record history of this licensee, and remains with the Department of
Transportation for possible use as enhancement in the event of anL subsequent suspensions,
despite the fact Appellant w& fully coop'erative with alternate the request made to him to
submit to the blood test process, and his full cooperation in their pursuit to extract blood

.'

from his arm@), but later abandoned by the officer and paramedic because of the apparent
inability or inexperience of the paramedic to penetrate the veins in the arm@)of Appellant to
extract the desired amounts of blood in their vial samples.
XI.

Course of Proceedings Below
Ada County Deputy Sheriff, Ian Hale, arrested Mr. Wagner for an alleged DUI
offense on October 17, 2007, and an evidentiary test for the concentration of alcohol was
requested by the officer pursuant to §18-8002, Idaho Code. Despite his immediate
cooperation with the method requested for blood extraction process, Appellant was issued a
Notice of Suspension on October 17,2007, claiming he refused the offered test for a breath
test, at which time his driver's license was seized from his possession and he was issued a
Temporary Driving Privilege pursuant to that Notice of Suspension. Appellant immediately
requested a Hearing and filed his Motion for a show cause hearing to reinstate his Driver's
License, as Mr. Wagner challenged the alleged refusal to submit to an evidentiary test, as he
was alternatively requested to submit to a blood test by an officer and cooperated fully in
their failed effort to draw blood. The Hearing was initially set before the regularly assigned
Magistrate to conduct the show cause matler, Thomas Watkiis, for November 14,2007, at
1:30 p.m., but was re-scheduled to December 12, 2007, at 1:30 p.m., and heard by a
substitute Magistrate, Honorable Theresa Gardunia.
The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order of Suspension was entered
December 12, 2007, from which an Appeal was taken to the District Court, where the
suspension was a f h e d , suggesting within the District Court Decision, that to accept Mr.

Wagner's argument, the effect "would limit officers to one opportunity to choose a test,
regardless of whether the test proved a feasible option", (Cl. R. P. 48, L. 22-23).

Statement o f Facts at the Show Cause Hearing
The witness who testified before the Court on December 12,2007, was Deputy Ian
Hale, appearing and testifying at the request of Defendant licensee. The relevant testimony
on the issue of the request for a Blood Alcohol Concentration test (BAC test) is contained in
the Record and identified in the kanscript of that Hearing, as follows:

,

Q. And 1,appreciate that: Now, also going to the FSTs, did youthen make
a determination to arrest the licensee and have him taken to the station?
A. Yes.
Q. Was the purpose of that to obtain from him [an] evidentiary test?
.. .
A. Yes.
Q. And did you then transport him to the station for that purpose?
A. Yes.
. .
Q. Andwhileat the station, did you to [sic] come to some arrangement with
respect to him submitting to and performing blood draw?
A. A blood draw was attempted at one point, yes.
Q. All right. Now, there was some conversation that you had with him about if
he would submit to and consent to a blood draw?
A. Yes:
Q. And did this licensee agree
to and consent to a blood draw?
A. Yes.
Q. And is that the particular form of evidentiary test you agreed with him to
obtain?
A. After he refused the breath test, yes.
Q. All right. You say after he refused a breath test.
Let's -- I take it you had some conversation with him preceding the blood test
issue -A. Yes.
Q. -- about a breath test?
A. Yes.
Q. And he was -- he didn't want to do a breath test?
A. Yes.
Q. But he said he would do a blood test?
A. Yes.
Q. And him agreeing to doing a blood test, you agreed to
perform a blood test?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, did you then procure or secure a blood draw physician or expert?

:

. . . .

. .

,

A. Yes.
Q. Did you obtain a phlebotomist or paramedic? What did you get?
A. A paramedic that I believe was also trained in phlebotomy or -- I hope that's
the right word. I hope I just didn't say something bad. I think they are phlebotomists
also.
Q. Kind of like that, yeah. A blood draw experl?
A. Yes.
Q. Now, did f i u know, who this blood draw expert was?
A. Never met him before.
Q. All right. This wasyour fvst acquaintance with that individual?
A. Yes.
. .
.
Q. Do ydu kndw what that individual'inameis?'.
:. . .
A.It was an odd sounding name. Bucken -- I can't remember.1 knowhe was a
certified EMT,.'Ibelieve, paramedic.
.
.
Q. He was certified?. . .
.
,
, .
.
A. Yes, as a matter of fact.
.
Q. And so -A. I'm sorry. I believe he w a s - - I don't know what their technical name is, but 1
believe he was a supervisor in their division.
Q. But you are satisfied .that
. was the individual who couldperform this test as agreed
to by you,and the licensee?
A. Yes.
Q. Was the licCnsee,'Mr. Wugnek thenfully and iomplitely cooperative with that
endeavor to secure thatblood sample?
A. Absolutely. Very cooperative.
Q. And amI to understand that there were a number of attempts to obtain9om
his veins blood?
A . Yes.
Q. And what became your understanding, then, from the phlebotomist on where
he was with the draw?
A. He informed me he had tried several times and he couldn't find a vein that could
produce blood.
Q. All right. And that was in which arm?
A. It was in the arm and the handand I cannot remember. It is in my report. I believe
it's his right arm.I believe.
Q. All right. Now, wouldyou agree that throughout that sequence of attempts
and endeavors topenetrate a vein, the licensee was continuing to befully
cooperative?
A. Absolutely.
Q. All right. And it became asituation where the phlebotomist, I take it, gave up?
A. Yes, I would -- I would say that'sprobably a good term, yeah.
Q. All right. With lhat, then, would it be afair statement to say that the blood draw
endeavor was abandoned?
A. Yas.
Q. But it was not a refusal regarding thal blood draw by the licensee?
A. No.
,

,

.
.

., .

.

,

Q. In fact, you recall that the licensee said, I've got another arm, start poking
here?
A. I believe the phlebotomist --I'm just going to call him aphlebotomist -- tried
both arms and before he startedpoking, he couldn'tjnd a vein, he tapped around and
probably tried thisfor about 30 to 40 minutes. And instead ofpoking over and over,
hejust said, I can'tjind one.
Q. All right. And then with that, now, I take it you along with the phlebotomist chose
to give up
- -further endeavor on the blood draw 7
~.-Yes.
Q. And I take it you then now said, now Mr. Wagner, how about we go back to the
idea of a breath test?
A. I said, you have to perform an evidentiary test. We didn't get blood. We need to try
a breath test, yes.
Q. All right. So it would be a fair statement to say you just began going down the list of
other possible types of evidentiary testing that you might want to obtain from him?
A. Well, I went back to the original, yes.
Q. The concept of a breath -A. Breath test, yes.
Q. Andhe didn't want to do a breath test to begin with, fair enough7
A. Yey.
Q. That's why he agreed to the bloodtest?
A . That's why he agreed to the blood test.
Q. All right. N ~ W didyou
,
ask of him a urine test?
A. No, I didn't.
Q. Were you set up to do a urine test?
A. Yes.
Q. So you could have hadyou chosen to?
A. Yes.
Q. And you know -- or you knew.that this licensee had declined the idea of a breath.
test, but would do the blood test and he never refused to do a urine test?,
A, Never refused a urine test, no.
(T. P. 9-14).
.
Q. Okay. Now, switching gears a little bit. So when you got down to the station, can
you describe everything that you do.when youpull him out of the carand where.. . .
A. .....After the15 minutes were up, Mr. wager informed me- well, I said, are you
going to perfohp the:breath test?-Hesaid, no:I said; okay. F%uZdyou be willing to
perform ablood test and he saidyes. And we called --I immediately called for - called
dispatch and requested a paramedic to come downso wecould~doa blood draw.
Approximatel$, 15 minutes site* that oy so, maybe 20 minutes, a paramediccame down
and attempt [ed] for the next 30 minutes to do a blood draw and couldn't. hen I
requested Mr. Wagner - after it was all done, I said, it is your duty to perform an
evidentiaiy testand you haven't done so at this point. We5.e unable to get the blood
draw so I'm requesti~gthat you do a breath test and he r$used once agaii
(T. P. 15-16).
~

STAMDARD OF REVIEW

. .

,

When considering a case on review from a lower court, the reviewing court will
accept the lower court's Findings of Fact if they are based upon substantial and competent
evidence, and although conflicting, will not set aside the Findings unless clearly erroneous,
See DeChambeau v. Estate ofsmith, 132 Idaho 568, 571, 976 P. 2d 922, 925 (1999); See
also Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829,41 P. 3d 257 (2002), (involving the license suspension
of Brian S. Halen).
The credibility and weight to be given evidence is in the province of the trial court,
and a reviewing court liberally construes the trial court's iindings of fact in favor of the
Judgment entered, See Bouten C o m k Co., KHF. Magnusin Co , 133 Idaho 756, 760, 992
P. 2d 751,755 (1999); See also Halen v State, Supra.
However, where reviewing Conclusions of Law, the reviewing court shall exercise
its &ee review over all legal questions presented by the construction and application of a
statute, See State v Montgomey, 135 Idaho 348, 349-50, 17 P. 3d 292,293-94 (2001); See
also Halen v State, Supra.
ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

WHETHER THE MAGISTRATE'S FINDINGS OF FACT APPELLANT REFUSED
TO SUBMIT TO AN EVIENTIARY TEST OFFERED BY THE OFFICER IS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE.

WHETHER THE MAGISTRATE'S CONCLUSION OF LAW APPELLANT
REFTJSED THE OFBERED EVIDENTLARY TEST AFTER COOPERATING
FULLY WITH THE PERFORMANCE OF THE OFFERED EVIUENTIARY TEST
OF HIS BLOOD, CONSTITUTES A LAWFUL BASIS TO SUSPEND
APPELLANT'S LICENSE UNDER §18-8002, IDAHO CODE.

WHETHER APPELLANT IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.
ARGUMENT PRESENTED ON ISSUES I AND I1
ISSUE I.
WHETHER THE MAGISTRATE'S FINDING OF FACT APPELLANT REFUSED
TO SUBMIT TO AN EVIENTIARY TEST OFFERED BY THE OFFICER IS
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL AND COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
ISSUE 11.
WHETHER THE MAGISTRATE'S CONCLUSION OF LAW APPELLANT
REFUSED THE QFFERED EVIDENTIARY TEST AFTER COOPERATING
FULLY WITH TPDE PROCESS OF THE OFFERED EVIDENTIARY TEST OF HIS
BLOOD, CONSTITUTES A LAWFIJL BASIS TO SUSPEND APPELLANT'S
LICENSE UNDER $18-8002, IDAHO CODE.
This appeal concerns the Magistrate's Order that suspended Mr. Wagner's driver's
license for 'refusar' to perform a "breath test", despite the clear and undisputed fact Mr.
Wagner ageed to and did submit to an offered "blood" test requested by this officer, being a
test process the officer agreed to select as his method of compliance with the Implied
Consent law under the statutes of the State of Idaho, 5 18-8002, Idaho Code. The officer
called in a paramedic to extract blood from Appellant's arm@)and made repeated attempts
to do so for a period of 30 to 40 minutes, seeking to extract blood from both arms, but for
whatever reason, not a sufficient quantity of blood was drawn to fill the two vial sample
tubes, and nothing was offered at the Hearing by the officer to explain the inability to get the
desired quantities. It simply appears the paramedic could not draw enough blood from the
veins in his arms or hands. The Paramedic then elected, at the'officer's direction or
acquiescence, to abandon any further process for blood draw testing, and they gave up on
blood extraction process, but as clearly demonstrated, Appellant had declined any idea of a
breath test prior to and after the blood testing process as the selected method of testing had

become a blood test. The Magistrate announced her Decision as contained in the Hearing
Transcript, to be as follows:
"Mr.Wagner, with respect to the refusal in this case, it is the officer's choice as to
what he chooses. In this case it's apparent to the Court that the officer's initial choice was a
breath test. Now, 1 don't view this as an accord. Based on that I'm going to fmd that the
initial refusal to take the breath test was a refusal under the statute and I'm going to sustain
the officer's suspension of your driver's license".
(Tr. P. 25).
That Finding of Fact by the Court Mr. Wagner had "refused" to submit to an

officer did elect, in his discretion and by way of a choice, to request a blood test, and Mr.
Wagner, in response to that request, agreed to such an evidentiary test of his blood, and
cooperated fully with that request. The testimony from the officer, as stated above,
demonstrates'the bl.ood draw had become the selected method of an evidentiary test to be
.

performed upon this licensee, and was

.

with ab~olutecooperationfrom Mr. Wagner

for a period between 30 and 40 minutes before the process was abandoned by the officer and
paramedic. The law does not appear to require, by the ordinary reading of the Statutory
language, that a licensee is required to submit to a battery or array of each and all test
methods available; the law does not suggest a licensee is required lo submit sequentially to a
.., other
breath test, then to a bloo8 test, and then.to a urine. test & then to a saliva test or some
,

a ,

.

'8.

.

.

. . ..

test of his b&ily fiuids, following arrest, for the suspicioni of alcohol preienbe that ma?
influence the' ability to Operate a motor vehicle. This licensee shduld Aot be: subject to
.

license

I

_

.

,

,

a

because of the &sequent choick of ,the officer and paramedic to
.

,

abandon the extradon process'for bloid, since the licensee did not.iefuik any aspect of this
.

,

process involved in the blood test selected by the officer as being the test of choice. The
testimony of Officer Hale confirms the test of blood was the choice as an alternative testing,

being a function or combination of a request, and an agreement between the officer and the
licensee, in lieu of the initial reluctance to perfom a breath test. This officer was given a
sufficient opportunity, at the time of the expressed reluctance of the licensee lo place faith in
or take a breath test, and in such a manner the officer did immediately request a different
test, which he specifically did pursue blood, similar to that sequence discussed in the Matter
Of Grzfith, 113 Idaho 364, 372, 722 P. 2d 92, 100 (1987). The officer here had the
awareness of his opportunity to request a different test method, approved by law
enforcement, and did so by requesting a blood test as the choice of an alternative evidentiary
testing fram the licensee, which did comply with the Implied Consent Law to address
alcohol concentration in his blood, and Mr. Wagner gave his accord to that request and did
cooperate fully and submit to the officer's attempt to obtain blood for forensic laboratory
testing.
The opportunity afforded the officer to request and submit to the blood test is
factually established in the Hearing Transcript, and with respect to the request and consent,
it was stated specifically:

Q. And while at the station, did you to [sic] come to some arrangement with
respect to him submitting to and performing blood draw?
A. A blood draw was attempted at one point, yes.
Q. All right. Now, there was some conversation that you had with him about if
he would submit to and consent to a blood draw?
A. Yes.
Q. And did this licensee agree to and consent to a blood draw?
A. Yes
Q. And is that the particular form of evidentiary test you agreedwith him to
obtain?
A. After he refused the breath test, yes.
Q. All right. You say after he refbsed a breath test.
Let's -- I take it you had some conversation with him preceding the blood test
issue -A. Yes.
Q. -- about a breath test?

A. Yes.
Q. And he was -- he didn't want to do a breath test.?
A. Yes.
Q. But he said he would do a blood test?
A. Yes.
Q. And him agreeing to doing a blood test, you agreed to
nerform a blood tesf?
A. Yes.

&

d

***

Q. Was the licensee, Mr. Wagner, thenfully and completely cooperative with that
endeavor to secure that bloodsample?
A. Absolutely Very cooperative.
Q. And am Ito understand that theye were a number of attempts to obtainj?om
his veins blood?
A. Yes.
Q. And what became your understanding, then, from the phlebotomist on where
he was with the draw?
A. He informed me he had tried several times and he couldn't fmd a vein that could
produce blood.

***

Q. All right. Now, wouldyou agree that throughout that sequence of atternpts
and endeavors topenetrate a vein, the licensee was continuing to befully
cooperative7
A. Absolutely.
Q. A11 right. And it became a situation where the phlebotomist, I take it, gave up?
A. Yes, I would -- I woulds y that's probably a good term, yeah
Q. All right. Wlth that, then, would it be afair statement to s y that the blood draw
endeavor was abandoned?
A. Yes.
Q. But it was not a refusal regarding that blood draw by the licensee?
A. No.
(T. P. 9-12).

***

A. .....After the 15 minutes were up, Mr. Wagner informed me -well, I said, are you
going to perform the breath test? He said, no. I said, okay. Wouldyou be willing to
perform a blood test and he saidyes. And we called --I immediately called for - called
dispatch and requested a paramedic to come down so we could do a blood draw.
(T. P. 15-16).

Because the blood test was offered as requested, and the licensee agreed to submit to
it and fully cooperated in the attempt to extract blood, the Magishate finding of fact of a
"refusal" to submit to a "breath" test, or the subsequent offer of a "breath" test, should

become irrelevant to what had become the officer's choice of an alternative evidentiary test
by means of a blood draw method. That test process was implemented and pursued. The
finding he refused an evidentiary test is unsupported by the statements from the officer,
since Appellant never refused to perform an offered test of his blood, and he agreed to
submit to this request of a blood draw as one of the available methods of an evidentiary test
by an officer, and the eventual choice of the officer to conduct that of several methods of an
evidentiary test was met; Appellat does believe the Implied Consent Statute, ($18-8002,
,

.

Idaho Code), has tieen satisfied as it is written in Idaho law. To conclude olherwise that the
licensee simply refuseda.br&atbtest that was alternatively superseded, notwithstanding.the
.

.

fact the officer later abaridoned the blood test process afier 30 to 40 minutes of attempting to
extract blood, doesn't it change the fact it was the "requested" test. Nowhere in the Statute
does it require a licensee to submit to all available testing methods to satisfy the Implied
Consent Statute. To say a licensee must be willing to submit to all test methods is not a
reasonable construction or interpretation of the statute, and the licensee is never informed of
that requirement. The officer was made fully aware of the reluctance of Mr. Wagner to place
any faith in the accuracy of a breath test, and that discussion had given the officer ample
opportunity to consider and request the more accurate test method for a blood test, which
was pursued in good faith and with full cooperation of the licensee. There can be no legal
basis to support a refusal against Mr. Wagner because of the inability of the paramedic to
extract blood from the veins of Mr. Wagner, or suggest that extraction failure eliminates the
selected method, that was requested and consent to by a licensee, and its meaning as
constituting effective compliance under the Implied Consent Statute.

Clearly, Mr. Wagner submitted to a requested blood draw, penetrating one or both
arms for 30 to 40 minutes, and it was the officer who elected to allow the paramedic to
abandon the blood draw. Mr. Wagner never told them to stop and never refused to assist or
cooperate in penetrating any of his bodily extremities. The blood draw was pursued without
force, and without resistance, though "force" is now allowed by the case authority in State v

Diaz, 144 Idaho 308, 160 P.3d 739 (2007), as long as it does not becomes unconstitutional.

In our case there was full cooperation and full compliance, with the request, agreement and
accord of the officer. It cannot be argued this evidentiary test procedure was not a method of
choice requested by the officer, and it cannot be argued this abandonment by the Law
Enforcement official could then be construed into a refusal under these facts.
Essentially, the Magistrate "factually" addressed the subject matter of "refusal" by
stating "I'm going to fmd that the initial refusal to take the breath test was a refusal under
the statute, and I'm going to sustain the officer's suspension of your license." (Tr. P. 25).
That approach seems onlyto beg the question, as the alternative choice of a test process had
been made.

In affirming the Magistrate's Decision, the District Court saw the "refusal" issue
somewhat more broadly, considering possibly the initial discussion and subsequent
discussion over a breath test, and concluded:
"there was sufficient evidence for the Magistrate to find that Deputy Hale requested
a breath test and Wagner "refused" that request." (C1. R. P. SO). No indication was indicated
whether the "initial" request or a "subsequent" request had formed the basis for the
"refusal".

This Appeal would encompass the concern whether the law requires a licensee to
submit to every conceivable form of an evidentiary testing process, and whether a licensee is
lawfully bound to submit to each testing process of his breath, then of his blood, then of his
urine, a d then of his saliva, and than of any other approved test melhod, all fro111 the same
moment of detention, before he is in compliance with the Implied Consent Statute.
The law does not specifically speak to a requirement a licensee must perform all of
them, or to submit to morc than one such test process requested under the Implied Consent
Law. The relevant portion of Idaho's Consent Law is contained in 518-8002, Idaho Code.
The Statute $18-8002 (3), Idaho Code also states that the "person shall be informed that if
he refuses to

to or if he fails to complete evidentiary testing, certain consequences

occur (a,b,c,d,e), and $18-8002(4), Idaho Code then states ifthe motorist refuses to submit
or

to complete the evidentiq testing, after the information has been given, then

other events, rights, obligations, and consequences come into place (a,b,c,d).
"Evidentiary testing" is defined to mean a procedure or test, or series of procedures
or tests, including the additional test authorized in subsection 10 of this section, utilized to
determine the concentration of alcohol or the presence of drugs or other intoxicating
substances in a person. (See $ 18-8002(9),Idaho Code.
We know that with respect to a Breath Test, they take a series of at least two (2)
samples, and possibly a third if more than a .02 spread is detected, to complete a breath test
process; with respect to a blood test, they take at least two (2) vials, if not more, to complete
that procedure of a blood test process.
The definition of "evidentiary testing" does not say the officer has a right to demand
all methods (blood, urine, breath, saliva, or other bodily substances), be conducted before a

.

~

. ..

,

.

licensee has met compliance with the M i k d Consent Statute:.The,test of procedure, or
,

series of tesis or procedures, is for blood,

breath;= urine,
.,

other bodily
. , substances,
.
and
.

.

should not be construed to be a composite of requiring performance of all in the context of
compliance associated with one detention.
The District Court has chosen to adapt a concept that the statute was designed to
accommodate the githering of "test results" or recover testable substances, and that should
allow all testing processes, not limiting the statutes' compliance of a licensee's implied
consent to just one offered test by a peace officer.
The District Court began to summarize its analysis by concluding:
Here, Wagner k~ifiallyrefused a request for a breath test and Deputy Hale relented tc
Wagner's request for a blood test on the implied condition that theblood draw
would be ,su~cessful..(Nowhe~e
is that in the record): When'the paramedic was
unable'to perform the blood draw because Wagner's veins would not accept the
needle, (nowhere does the record suggest Mr. Wagner's veins would not accept a
needle). Deputy Hale renewed his request for a breath test, which Wagner again
refused. ~ e i u t Hale's
y
objective in all of this was not to secure a '!refusal" for
purposes of Idaho Code 5 18-8002, but to obtain evidence fkom which he could
determine whetherWagner was legally intoxicated. It was Deputy Hale's choice as
to which type of test he would use to accomplish this objective. Under the
circumstances, that is, the paramedic's inability to perform the blood draw, he . .
ultimately chose to request a breath test. The mere fact that Deputy Hale initially
decided to accommodate Wagner's request for a blood draw, did not revoke his
ability to request another type of test when the blood draw later proved unsuccessful.
(Is that contained in the Statute or made part of the information to be given a
licensee in the advice of rights and consequences?) Deputy Hale's testimony
provided substantial and competent evidence to support the magistrate,,^ finding that
Wagner was asked to perform a breath test and he refused to submit. Furthermore,
this case can be distinguished from those cases such as Smith, where thedefendant
initially declined a blood-alcohol test but then, within a Short period of time,
reconsidered and assented to the test. Here, Wagner never assented to the breath test
which Deputy Hale originally requested and then re-requested after the blood draw
was unsuccessful.
,

The District Court then focused on the idea of being a duty of a licensee to
submit to all methods of all tests and procedures, without limitation or exception,
where the Court goes on to state:

.

,

.

.

.

,

.

To.accept ~ a g n e r ' sargument would limit officers to one opportunity to choose a
test, regardless of whether that test proved a feasible option. Such a rule would
hs,tratethe purpose of Idaho Code $ 18-8002,which is to authorize a police officer
to administer an evidentiary test for concentration of alcohol, drugs, or other
intoxicating substances where the officer has reasonable grounds to believe a person . .
has been driving'underthe influence. See I.C. $18-'8002(1).'In short, the choice as to
. . ..
which type of evidentiary test.is to be administered lies with the officer,notthe
defend&, and this choice remains w'ith the officer until either an evidentiarv test is
actually performed:or the defendant unequivocallv refuses the reauested test, Here, . . .
no evidentih test was ever verformkd. not because the varamedic was unable to
draw blood, as asserted by Wagner, but because ultimately Wagner himself refused
to take a breath test. Therefore, there was sufficient evidence for the Magistrate to
find that Deputy Ilale requested a breath test and Wagner "refbsed" that request.
'

.

Idaho case law has concluded the choice of evidentiary

for concentration of

alcohol, drugs, or other intoxicating substances, does rest with the peace officer, not the
defendant. See Halen v. State, 136 Idaho 829, and 4 1P. 3d 257 (2002); see also In Re

Grzfiths, 133 Idaho 364,370, '744, P.2d 92,92 (1987).

In this encounter, the selected choice of the test process to be pursued was
determined to be a blood draw because of the conversation that ensued befween the officer
and the licensee, and the licensee consented to that selected choice requested
- . by the officer,
..

and cooperated fully and completely~andsubjected his'body to repeated penetrations for a.
,

::

.

.

period of time that extended from 30 to 40 minutes,
- no fault of his own, the
, . and though
,.1 , 1 :

.. .

...

.:.

method of test was then ibandoned. 'fie Dishict ~ourt'ciseauthoii'ty andita&ory lmgiage
,

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

.

,.

.

,

.

,

specifically says a.licen&e must subjkct himself to the'full ariai ofthe intire gambit of test
,

...

.

types that may be available, after one is requested and being performed, and if without
result, is yet is obligated to be subjected to one after the other, until some level of testable

. .

.,

.

results is obtained. The District Court could only suggest it would appear to fixstrate the
of the Statute. That is not what has been stated to be Public Policy on the Consent
Statute.
With respect to thc analysis of the Implied Consent Statute, Idaho Supreme Court
determined in Headv. State, 137 Idaho 1,43 P.3d 760 (2002), the license cannot be
suspended if "(6) the defendant did not refuse to submit to the requested evidentiary test."
(Id. p.4-5). That concept of having submitted to a requested test is again announced in State
v. Irwin, 143 Idaho 102,106,137, P.3d 1024,1029 (Ct of Appeals 2006).
The law has focused on a licensee's consent and submission to a requested test, not
securing test results. The request must be one that is requested andlor directed at the instance
of the officer and the licensee must consent to and submit to at least one type of test process
being offered by the officer, and it could be an alternative test request. That is a reasonable
interpretation of the Statute and the state of the case law; the compliance to one such test
process should be also the result from consideration and application of the Rule of Lenity in
construing the Implied Consent Law. A driver's consent to submit to a requested test for
alcohol concentration offered to him is the issue, not recovery of testable substances. It
cannot be expanded upon to meet some desired purpose, or some analysis that suggests all
methods or t m of

will be performed, the testing unlimited, or that the processes must

produce a recovery of testable substances or produce tests results. If the law is to be
construed differently, then the licensee must be clearly informed of these unclear
consequences, as otherwise that would entail the application of a "broad bush" approach to
I

the understandmg of the Implied Consent Law, and engage in an attempt to interpret the
Statute in a way contrary to the Doctrine of Lenity. Under the Rule of Lenity, criminal

.

statutes must be strictly construed in favor of the accused. State v. Barnes, 124 Idaho 379,
380, 859 P.2d 1387, 1388 (1993). The same principles of construction that apply to criminal
statutes apply

to

and re~lations,even those promulgated by administrative

agencies. See Rhodes v. Industrial Comm 'n, 125 Idaho 139, 142,868 P.2d 467,470 (1993);
see Bingham Memorial Iiospital v. Dept. of Health and Weyare, 112 Idaho 1094, 1096,739
P.2d 393,395 (1987); see State v. Mills, 128 Idaho 426,429,913 P. 2d 1196,1199 (App
1996). The concept of compliance with the Implied Consent Law and the cooperation of a
licensee in a blood draw request must be construed in favor ofthe accused, especially in
criminal cases where evidence is being sought upon the seizure of the individual. Clearly,
§ 18-8002, Idaho Code, is a criminal statute, and the application of Lest must he narrowly

construed to the issues if he consented to the test and cooperated in the testing process.
It was not the licensee who chose to terminate the test process, it was the officer, and
regardless whether the officer chose to abandon his selected type of evidentiary testing
process, thet -

to the type of alternative requested evidentiary test still stands, and the

licensee
"(6)did not refuse lo submit to the requested evidentisuy test.", (seeli'ead, Supra.)
If this Court.wants to expand the language contained in the law, to require recovery
of testable substances or produce test "results" be obtained before it can be concluded a
licensee is in compliance with the Statute, then the Court must interpret the statute
differently than in the manner it would appear required to do so under the Rule of Lenity,
and must change the contents of the information to be given to the licensee under § 188002(3), Idaho Code. The officer will then have to

the licensee differently that has

been the custom, practice and procedure under the current language of the statute. Lfthis

Court elects to conclude the obligation of a licensee is to comply to the end he will produce
some form of acceptable testable substances or produce test results, and that the licensee
must submit to as many types and methods of testing processes and procedures as are
necessary to get some form oftest results before he can be held to comply with the Idaho
Implied Consent Law, then the Court will also have to require different information be given
to a licensee regarding what constitutes a refusal, as such consequence information is
mandated by 818-8002 (3), Idaho Code The Court may then have to modify its holding in
Head v. Stale, supra, where in 2002, it held a license shall not bc suspended when "(5) that
defendant was not advised of the infonnation regarding refusal mandated by 818-8002,
Idaho Code, (Id. at4-5).
:.,

.

,

.

. ,

..

.
. .

.,,

,

,

.

.

,

,

The licensee was never advised, in this case, nor does the current state of the law so
inform any licensee that be will be deemed to be a refusal if he only submitted to one type of
test process, but not consent to take all test type processes that may alternatively be asked of
him.
The question at issue is whether Mr. Wagoner's drivers' license could be subject to
Court ordered suspension under 5 18-8002, Idaho Code, when he cooperated fully with the
I

peace officer's alternative request, agreement, and performance under his consent and

I

submission to a blood test, after he expressed his lack of faith with a breath test type process.
and both parties agreed and consented to a blood draw testing process.
The Magistrate is incorrect to hold Idaho's Implied Consent Law applies only to an
"initial" evidentiary test offered by a peace officer to a driver, and not consider subsequent
alternative requests or accords on the type of testing process that was consented to and

I

undertaken. The District Court seems to wants &as the element of compliance, and if

,

,

the test of choice is unsuccessful, you are obligated to consent to another, and another, and
another method or type of testing. In reaching that conclusion, the district Court would
suggest, if not'actually @ as part of her Decision, that '<_noevidentim test was ever
performed, not because the paramedic was unable to draw blood, as asserted by Wagner, but
..

because ultimateiy Wagner himself,refused to take a breath test." (Cl. R. P.49-50):Such a

.

conclusion misstates what took place for 30 to 40 minutes. A blood draw wasperformed,
.

..

.

.
..

.

but producedno testable results.:Such concept is a broad brush approach, reachingbeyond...
thelimits ofithe Doctrine of Lenity, and not well-grounded in existing~legalanalysis, as the
licensee is never given information to that effect, or to the concept that a test is not
performed if the officer abandons the process when he can't produce testable substances, or
that test results of some form

be obtained, or it will be deemed a refusal. We would

submit this conclusion is patently contrary to existing law and existing Public Policy on
Implied Consent. The Magistrate limited its "refusal" concept to the "initial" test suggested
for use by the peace officer, and would disregard any request for a different test, or an
alternative test, or a different test that is then administered, or a need for results, and leaves
the conclusion to be such that alternative testing can neither qualify nor overcome the initial
test threshold, and the voluntary cooperation with the officer on a selection of an alternative
test, requested and pursued by the peace officer, is meaningless. The concept suggested by
the Magistrate appears to run contrary to the intent of Smith v State, 115 Idaho 808, 812,
770 p.2d 817,821 (Ct. App. 1989). The Magistrate ruling emphasized it is the "initial"
evidentiaty test the officer requests upon which Idaho's Implied Consent Statute operates,
and Appellant would argue that should not be and has not been the interpretation of the

. . .

:

,

-. ., . . ..

.,-

,

. ,, . . ,

.

.

.

. ...

,.

. ,,' .

Statute, especially given the analysis of Smith v State, Supra. To again focus on what the
Magistrate held:

..

Mr. Wagner, with respect to the refusal in this case, it is the officer's choice as to
what test he chobses. In this case it's apparent to the Court that the officer's initial choice
was a breath test. Now, I don't view this as an accord. I view the refusal, the initial refusal,

.

,

,

and then the officer's allowing you to go forward with a blood test as an accominodation,
but certainly not an accord. . .
Based on that, I'm going to find that the initial rehsal to take the breath test was a
refusalunder the statute andI'm going to sustain the officer's suspension
of your driver's
. .
license.
See Tr. P.25, L.15-25.
:

.

,

:

.

.

.

,

The issue oEthisxefusa1 debate may also be viewed as whether Mr. Wagner's.

;

voluntary cooperation and submission to the alternative evidentiary test offered and agreed
to by the peace officer is sufficient to satisfy Idaho's implied consent law to avoid a license
suspension, regardless of the recovery of testable substances.
This appeal will ultimately turn to a question of statutory interpretation and
application of the Rule of Lenity. The Court does exercise free review over legal questions
concerning the construction and application of a statute. HaZen v. State, 136 Idaho. 829,

There is no clear statutory authority and no compelling case law to clearly support
the Magistrate's determination Idaho's Implied Consent Statute only applies to the "initial'?
evidentia~ytest offered by a peace officer, and bad it been the intent of the law to so require,
then the information required to be given in the statute would contain such notification that
subsequent test requests are meaningless, at the same time, there must be continuing consent
given to all fonns of requested tests, to the end a testable substance is obtained to produce
test results

... .

,

.

This issue presented is somewhat different from the situation before the Idaho
Supreme Court in State v Diaz, 144 Idaho 308, 160 P. 3d 739 (2007). Although the
question in Diaz did not involve a second or alternative voluntary test, the facts underlying
that decision may help focus the question presented here. in Diaz there was no question the
driver refused to take a breath test, and a blood draw was taken from him "involuntary", and
with the use of force. The situation presented by this case involves a driver who had
reluctance to take a breath test, hut agreed lo a blood draw that was voluntary, and that was
. . no sufficient.:..
performed and purs'uedfq a period of between 30 to 40 minutes, and when

quantities of blood were extracted, the officer abandoned the test. There was consent to the
blood draw and cooperation in the process; no refusal to the process no resistance and no
need for any use of force.
The Diaz case would suggest our Magistrate missed the mark when having declared
the "initial" evidentiary test requested by the peace officer is the only relevant concern
whether a driver has declined the first test under the Implied Consent Statute.
If our Magistrate reached the decision in reliance, upon a review of Halen v. State,
136 Idaho 829,41 P.3d, 257 (2002) andin The matter of Grfiths, 113 Idaho 364,744 P. 2d,
92 (1987), we would argue that Ifalen and Grlfiths do not stand for the proposition that a
,

.

, . .

.

..

,

.

..

driver's reluctance 6r refusal &take the frit offefed.evidentiarytest is the:only relevad
concern with respect to cdmpliance with.Idaho's Implied Consent Law. Those,two . .
. ,
. .
..
,
decisions could arguably' staridfor thg6ppdsite p"dpositioxi, as an officer should beallow6d
,

an opportunity to request a second or alternative test, if the first testis declined for some
,

. .

good faith reason 6;explmation that ;&ndeisan opportunity to address an alternative test. A
..

,

., >

driver's submission to a second or alternative evidentiary test requested by the officer should
be just as effective, as if the driver had submitted to the first offered evidentiary test.
The distinction between the Magistrate's Decision in this case, and the rule stated in
Hulen and Grzflths, again huns on the fact it is the officer-not the driver-who has the
discretion to determine
which evidentiary test or 'alternative test will be administered.
.

.

,

.

,

Though it is stated in Hulen, citing Gv@ths,.the defendant's willingness to take another.
the effect of his refusal to subinit to the form of test
form of test ~eneral1ydoesnot:negate
.. ,..

requested by the officer,.we don't here have & a willingness of the driver,.but a request

.

.

.

and mutual agreement to have a blood test be the selected test process t o be administered to.
the licensee. Obtaining test results or to rccover testable substances, is not implicitly made
part ofthe "consent" in the Implied Consent Statute. The focus is only directed to a driver's
to take the requested test, and cooperation in the process, not a guarantee to the
successfulness of the test, or that the officer will be able to produce some results or obtain
some level of testable substances. It is also to be noted, the Court in Hulen did not stop with
its thought on willingness to take another test, but went on to quote statements that were
made part of the GrifJiths decision, by addressing the controlling idea that a driver can
articulate to the police officer at the time of any refusal of a particular test so that the olficer
is then given an opportunity to request a different test. See In Re Grzflths, 113 Idaho 364 at
372,744 P.2d, 92 at 100 (1987); See quofedreference in ITulen, 136 Idaho 829,41 P.3d at

In Hulen and Grzflths, it would appear that whatever the driver's fears of needles
were, such fears did not sufficiently encourage the peace officer to take an opportunity to
request an alternative evidentiary test, such as was actually done here with the request for an

,

,

.

.

. ..

~

,

.

alternative blood type blood draw. In contrast, the testimony of the officer is that Mr.
Wagner expressed his lack of faith in a breath test, and that dialogue was sufficient to give
rise to an opportunity for Officer Hale to request he consent and submit to a blood test, and
it was so requested and Mr. Wagner consented and fully cooperated with the alternative
requested test and did submit hlly to the marathon of a 30 to 40 minute effort at a blood
draw.
Affording a peaceofficer.an opportunity torequest a different.evidentiary.t;estafter a
.

.

:

.

driver declined to submit to.the,initialtest woald simplybecome irrelevant if &ornpliance

,

. . ,.

:..

n o t t o submit tothe first evidentiary test. .The driver's volunVary submission to.the alternate.

.

.. .. ..

..

with Idaho's implied consent law was dependent only upon the driver's rehsal or decision

. .

.

.

..

.

. ..

evidentiary test would merely become meaningless, so a different evidentiary testing
process would not even then be pursued. That concept rnust be contained in the Information
Advisory Form and Notification of Suspension to a licensee, which obviously it was not,
.

. ..

,

and that is because that isnot the current state of the law. Apparently, wbat is beinglost..in

...

:

the "shuffle" of this characterization over "initial" or "alternative" evidentiary testing is
concern over the Public Policy involved for obtaining scientific information about blood
.::

:. .

alcohol levels. That issue of P~zblicPolicy was declared by the Court of Appeals in S k t h v;
State, 115 Idaho 808,812,770 P.2d 817,821 (Ct.App.1989), and later adopted and modified
by the Idaho Supreme Court in Pangburn v,State, 124 Idaho 139,141,857 P.2d 618,620
(1993). This Public Policy is reinforced by recognizing a driver's right to render a voluntary
submission to a an alterative evidentiary test

compliance with Idaho's implied consent

law, after a driver has declined to subniit to the initial evidentiary test offered by the peace

. ...

,

.:.$.

.

,..

officer, and it does not hinge on obtaining any particular level, degree, or quality of results
or recovery of testable substances.
Certainly, considering the context of the facts presented in Halen and Grzfj%ks,there
are circumstances where a peace officer will have the opportunity to request again, and a
drivermay be required to consent to a subsequent evidentiary test. It would appear such
.

,

.

..i* -.:

,

circumstance was considered sufficient here to give rise for the officer to request an
alternative test and a cooperative acceptance for the use of a blood test as was then offered
by the Officer. If a police officer voluntarily agrees to and offcrs a second evidentiary test to
which the driver has voluntarily agreed, and completely submitted to, and fully complied
with 100% cooperation, then there is no compelling public policy to support the argument a
driver's submissionio analternative evidentiary test codd notbe cbbsidered.co@pliiilrce . ; . . .
with Idaho's Implied Consent Law, with or without results, or regardless of the level or
quality of testable substances or results obtained. The circumstances here are no different
than had the driver submitted to the fiist offered breath test, and the machime failed to
generate a reading, or to produce a valid san~ple,and the process was abandoned. In similar
fashion, if the test type is a blood draw, but a paramedic, for whatever reason, could not get
enough blood to fill both vials, after a multitude of penetrations were completed, wouldn't it
be correct to say the consent was complete with the full cooperation from the licensee with
the test type process, regardless of the ability to produce test results
Consider once again the recent Decision in State v Dim,144 Idaho 308, 160 P.3d
,.'

739 (2007). Here we fimd om Court

.

,

authority to a police officer to "compeP'

' '

withdrawal of blood under the police power granted in $18-8002, iduho Code. That concept
of police power is now being upheld. If a police officer can involuntarily pursue a forced

blood draw type process, then in a situation where a driver "voluntarily" cooperates to give
blood with a requested blood draw and is pursued in the presence of the expert medical
technician and the licensee does everythuig asked of him, should that not also be ruled valid
compliance, and

considered a refusal under the Statute.

The Statute requires a driver to "submit" to a requested evidentiary test, and the law
is not based on whether test samples are recoverable or valid. Undeniably, this driver did
submit to and cooperated fully with the requested blood test, and was agreeable to provide
.

.

evidence to be. determined
&om the.hloodextracted. The testimony of owofficer c o n f i e d . .
there was no need for a physical struggle to address the blood draw, but emphatically
confimed the licensee demonstrated complete and total cooperation. Consequently,
according to State v. Diaz, 144 Idaho 230, and State v. Worthington, 138 Idaho 470 (App.
2003), we fmd the authority for a blood draw is authorized only through the Implied
Consent Law, and Mr. Wagner consented to that process. If a licensee has consented to the
evidentiary test draw process to test his blood, by virtue of his driver's license, under
Idaho's Implied Consent Law, there can be no refusal.
Here, the officer c1iose blood testing to which Defendant did not struggle or seek to
prevent. Once the officer selected this blood draw test, and the Defendant consented and
complied, could be no rehsal, and could be no refusal as a matter of logic under Diaz,
Supra, as there was compliance with his Implied Consent under § 18-8002(1), Idaho Code,

in every aspect of that event.
Possibly, this case could be viewed under the analysis of what has been considered
"delayed assent" language (to an alternative test) found within i n Re Pangbuvn, 124 Id 135,
and In re Gvfiths, 113 Idaho 364. See also State v. Bock, 80 Idaho 296,328 p.2d 1065

::

,

.

,

.

.

.

(1958). That authority would state "the only way he can withdraw that consent is to
expressly refuse the "test". Mr. Wagner agreed to submit himself to a blood test, and he was
expressly requested to submit to the blood draw. The state has not been prejudiced by Mr.
Wagner's expression of concern over his lack of faith in the breath test, and by his sincere
concerns, did give the oflicer the opportunity to request an alternate test which everyone
agreed to, and the officer summoned the paramedic to pursue the draw.
. ..

.

.

The State could not argue it has been prejudiced under any exigency exemption; as
d
(1989), as the opportunity to seek
stated in (State v. Wooleiy, 1.16-Idaho368,775 ~ . 2 1210)
and to timely secure a blood draw was not lost, but rather pursued irmnediately and for: an .
extended period of time, with'full.cooperation from the licensee.

.

.

This-lice~xsee.did"submiP'
to the requested blood test as required by jjS18-8002 &
18-8002A, Idaho Code, and under the scientific standard stated by the Court in Pangburn,
the moment of any possibIe delay between the time the breath test was declined, and the
time the blood draw was requested and consented to and was pursued, did not materially
affect any possible outcome of that test. See also Smith v. State, 115 Idaho 808, 811,770

To address this case any other way than to conclude there has been coinpliance with
the Implied Consent Law, this Court is faced with the reality there is otherwise no lawful
compliance with the notice re~uirementsof 518-8002 and 518-8002A, Idaho Code,
because the statute requires specific and substantial notice to a licensee, and the suspension
advisory form as presently written, does not inform a licensee that it is meaningless should
he be reluctant to take the initial offered breath test, but fully cooperates with a request and
consents to a blood test because his license will still be suspended. The authority on the

.
.

..

.

.

.

,

required notification is addressed generally in Beem v. State, 119 Idaho 289,805 P. 2d 49,
and In the Matter of Virgil, 126 Idaho 946,895 P. 2d 182 (1995). As presently written, not
only does the advisory form fail to provide any such notification that the license will be
suspended, regardless of consent and cooperation
with an alternative test.requested, but the
. .
.

..

officer has failed to tell Mr. Wagner such a consequence of the meaningless consent and
meaningless cooperation to the alternate test will only result in his license suspension. No
such notification in any form exists, and under § 18-8002(3), Idaho Code, it becomes
mandatory grounds to vacate a suspension if the person was not informed of the
consequences of submitting to evidentiaw testing rcquired by the statute. In our case, the
driver is not informed of the potential of his license suspension and sanctions as set forth in
either $18-8002 or $18-8002A, Idaho Code, if he declines the breath test, but his consent lo a
request to submit to a blood draw, even by agreement, will still result in an absolute license
suspension for one year because he declined the initial test, despite the fact he cooperated
fully with the blood draw, and avoidedneed for a rorced blood draw. In effect, this
Appellant now faces the futility of his good faith cooperation with a voluntary blood draw,
even where forced blood draws are authorized by the Dim case, and constitute compliance.
.

Neitberthe actual text of either $18-8002 or $18-8002A, Idaho Code, nor.the. . .

.

holdings in any Idaho appellate case, .;upport the interpretation of our Magistrate, or that of
the District Court, as Idaho's implied consent statute does not require a driver's submission
only to the "initial" evidentiary test requested by a peace officer, and those statutes do not
require results or testable substances to be obtained as a condition of compliance with the
Implied Consent Law.

~

.

..

. ,

When apeace officer elects to administer an alterative evidentiary test, to which the
driver submits his body to blood extracting efforts for 30 to 40 minutes, then Idaho Public
Policy must be regarded as being served and fully satisfied, and there is no applicable legal
standard - either in statute or case law - that disqualifies the good faith consent,
'

'

.

. . -. .

cooperation, andpeffort:to securiblood by a test process administered atthediscretion of the.

~

.

law enforcement officer without force, where no results are successfully obtained, as it is the
consent and the submission and the cboperation that represents the essence of what Idaho's
.

,

?

- ;

implied couse~tstatute..was
meant to qchieve,regardlesswhat the extent of recoveiyof.

. . .

..

,.

testable substances bay be or not be;
'

,
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,
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ARGUMENT PRESENTED ON ISSUE 1x1
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WHETHER APPOLLANT.
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IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY FEES ON APPEAL.
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When findings are made without
areasonable basis in fact or law, and violate
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constitutional or statutory provisions, or in excess of authority, or were madeupon unlawful
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procedure, or were.clearly erroneous or arbitrary and capricious, attorney fees &d costs are
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awarded pursuant to $12-117, Idaho Code. See Roeder Holdings; L.L.C. v. Ada
,
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Idaho 809,41
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$12-117, Idaho Code, provides for attorney fees to a person, in any administrative or
.
adverse, . parties with a state agency,.a city, a county or
civil judicial . proceeding,:.involving
. : >
,

.

1

,

:

other taxing district, That statute allows award of reasonable attorney fees, witness fees and
reasonable expenses to the party, if the Court fmds in favor of the person, and finds the
agency, city or county acted without a reasonable basis infact or law.

,:

.

Appellant would' respe~tkllyclaim a right to recover his fees and costs incurred in
this appeal, as the Order of Suspension.was pursued and granted without a well founded
basis in law, contrary to Implied Consent Statute and Rule of Lenity, and should be
.

reversed, as there existed no basis to support the entry of an order in fact or law:
.
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CONCLUSION
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The decision of the Magistratemust be reversed, as there is no statutory authorityor

. ., . .
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. .
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case law to support the Magistrate's determination Idaho's implied consent statute would
only apply to the "initial" test-offeredby apeace officer. When the officer elects.to offer a n
alternative process for a licensee to submit to a blood test, which the driver has in good faith
agreed to perform, and he cooperates fully, and submits absolutely to that process, it must he
held to lawklly satisfy Idaho's implied consent statute, as it is consistent with the
established public policy previously announced by our courts. To rule otherwise would
place the Suspension Advisory Form into disqualification, for its lack of adequate
information, as it did not substantially inform the driver it would be a meaningless
consequence of his good faith coinpliance and cooperation to submit to a subsequent
requested blood test offered by the peace officer and that regardless of the subsequent
alternative test requested, and his license is subject to an absolute suspension.
The Magistrate's Order is not supported by substantial evidence for a refusal in the
Record, but rather is inconsistent with the Record, and contrary to the officer's testimony
and the due process requirements, and Rule of Lenity announced under Idaho law. The Law
of Consent does not rest upon recovery of testable substances, or "test results", but rather
only upon consent of a licensee and his cooperation with a test being conducted at the
request of the officer to determine the alcohol concentration, if any, in the blood of an

.. . .

,

. .

. .,

individual. The matter must be remanded to the Magistrate for entry of an Order setting
aside the suspension, reinstating Appellant's driving privileges, and rescinding and
expunging the Order of Suspension from Appellant's Driving Record. This Court should
enter an order for an award of attorney fees and costs to Appellant as provided for in $12117, Idaho Code.

Dated this 24'Day of September, 2009.
, . .

Attorney for Appellant

CERTFICATE OF SERVICE
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I HEREBY CERTIFY That on the 24' day of September, 2009,1 caused a true and
correct copy of the above and foregoing to be delivered to the following persons at the
following addresses as follows:
Lawrence G. Wasden
700 West State Street
Boise, Idaho 83720
Idaho Supreme Court
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, Idaho 83702
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